

# Combat Edge

50th ANNIVERSARY EDITION

AIR COMBAT COMMAND'S SAFETY MAGAZINE

50 YEARS OF SAFETY

50 YEARS OF SAVING LIVES



# Congratulations



## Combat Edge

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by a military graphic artist.*

*1961 is when it all started. On our current cover, you can find more  
covers from each of our past 50 years. How many do you remember?*

## Combat Edge

Volume 20 Issue 1, ACC SP 91-1

**4 | MAJ BOB WHITE ON SAFETY**  
*by Maj Bob White*  
*Reprinted from TAC ATTACK, March 1963*

**10 | F-15 SITUATIONAL EMERGENCY TRAINING**  
*by Capt Jim Hale and Capt Jim Williford*  
*Reprinted from TAC ATTACK, March 1978*


**16 | THE REAL THREAT**  
*by Col James Rider*  
*Reprinted from TAC ATTACK, February 1981*

**20 | WHOA!**  
*by Lt Col Ezequiel Parrilla, Jr.*  
*Reprinted from COMBAT EDGE, May 1997*

**24 | MONTHLY AWARDS**

**26 | QUARTERLY AWARDS**

**27 | STATS**



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### THE COMBAT EDGE

(USPS 0531-170) (ISSN 1063-8970) IS PUBLISHED QUARTERLY BY AIR COMBAT COMMAND, HQ ACC/SEM, 175 SWEENEY BLVD, LANGLEY AFB VA 23665-2700. PERIODICAL POSTAGE PAID AT HAMPTON, VA, 23670 AND ADDITIONAL MAILING OFFICES. POSTMASTER: PLEASE SEND CHANGES OF ADDRESS TO HQ ACC/SEM, 175 SWEENEY BLVD, LANGLEY AFB, VA 23665.

**DISTRIBUTION:** F. OPR: HQ ACC/SEM. DISTRIBUTION IS BASED ON A RATIO OF ONE COPY PER 10 PERSONS ASSIGNED. AIR FORCE UNITS SHOULD CONTACT THE COMBAT EDGE STAFF TO ESTABLISH OR CHANGE REQUIREMENTS.

**ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTIONS:** AVAILABLE TO NON-DOD READERS FOR \$51.00 (\$71.40 OUTSIDE THE U.S.) FROM THE SUPERINTENDENT OF DOCUMENTS, PO BOX 371954, PITTSBURGH PA 15250-7954. ALL SUBSCRIPTION SERVICE CORRESPONDENCE SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO THE SUPERINTENDENT, NOT HQ ACC/SEM.

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# ACCent

## ON SAFETY



Gen William M. Fraser III  
Commander

We've come a long way from the first 20-page issue of TAC ATTACK in January of 1961 to today's multimedia-filled, COMBAT EDGE magazine. Now with over 50 articles published annually and distribution via print and Internet, we are able to reach more than 130,000 Airmen throughout the Command and even more worldwide across the Air Force. Though the look has changed throughout the years, the message remains the same.

It serves us well to go back and review the lessons that have helped us achieve our great legacy. In this commemorative issue, you'll see articles that span the last 50 years. Yet their messages of safe mission execution are as applicable today as they were when they were written. I encourage everyone to read these articles and assess how you can incorporate their timeless practices into your personal and professional lives.


All of us have seen changes in faces, organizations, and environments over the years. Still, our commitment to safely executing the mission from the front gate to the flight line remains constant. In 1960 our Class A aviation mishap rate was 14.9 per every 100,000 flying hours; today it is down to 0.772. Your incredible efforts made 2010 one of the safest years on record for the Command.

As impressive as these achievements are, we must continue to strive for excellence. Doing it right the first time every time takes a team effort. It is vital that we focus on compliance through engaged leadership and individual vigilance at every level. This philosophy is neither new nor earth shattering. It is seen daily, from a commander's visible safety presence, to an Airman's strict adherence to tested and validated operating procedures. In this special edition of COMBAT EDGE, you will see the timelessness of safety principles that have and will continue to make a difference in our combat effectiveness.

Every member of our ACC team continues to do amazing work in support of our Nation. I applaud your tireless dedication and professionalism to executing our challenging missions at home and abroad day in and day out. Stay focused, be good Wingmen, take care of one another, and continue delivering the combat capability of Air Combat Command safely. I am proud to serve alongside all of you.



# MAJOR "Bob" White ON SAFETY



## Reprinted from TAC Attack, March 1963

*This month we have a treat from one of the sharpest pilots in the business, Major Bob White, who took time out from his fine work with the X-15 program to write his views on Flying Safety. Although Bob has no magic formula, he does have some good thoughts about the basic principles that form the foundation for safe and successful flights. I'm certain that you will enjoy his article as much as I did.*

~ Col James K. Johnson,  
TAC Chief of Safety, 1963

**T**here are many times when a discussion of flying safety will give a pilot the lethargic view that it's all the same old stuff he's heard over and over again. And it would be completely true except that each and every one of us has had one or more actual experiences where we just barely squeezed by to a safe flight. The story behind some of these flights usually falls under one of the many categories that make up this thing called Flying Safety.

Thinking back over my own experiences, I was tempted to tell a few of these stories on myself, but such true confessions are best told at the Officers' Club when your buddies can usually top the best tale you have. Regardless, my experiences have impressed me with two factors that have most often made the big difference; flight planning, and knowledge of the equipment. These subjects may seem mundane. We've beaten them around since flying school days, so I suspect that you'd rather read about things like skill and judgment from someone who has done experimental test flying. These certainly are excellent qualities and well debated, when fighter pilots get together, but I've found that they vary as the sum total of a pilot's experience and that in the long run it's the fundamentals that add up to safe flight operation.





We've all read too many times about someone crashing short of destination because they ran out of fuel. Many of these flights involved the old T-bird. Usually the pilot started from scratch with a flight plan inadequate for the situation. It's tough to be caught in a corner but it's mighty grim if you don't give yourself an even chance. Just recently I got caught in a fuel sweat during one of those maximum range flights. I'm sure some of you can recall a tight one of your own. After I "just made it" I had a chat with the weatherman. He explained that a trough had developed and caused wind shifts that threw me a curve. The curve made me feel like a .200 hitter facing Christy Mathewson in a World Series. Although I may be criticized for pushing out to maximum range, I was grateful that my flight planning was accurate, even though a bit tight. During preflight I noticed that fuel was low in one of my tanks. Despite the annoyance and extra time I called the refueling crew back and took on "only" 22 gallons. You guessed it; that 22 gallons made the difference.

As much as I've been impressed that a comparatively simple flight from point A to point B requires application of professional knowledge, so too does my flight that satisfies a part of the Air Force mission. Despite the mission difference, the fundamental ideas of flight planning and equipment knowledge apply equally to a fighter pilot with ordnance to put on target, a transport pilot delivering troops to a drop zone, or in my case taking the X-15 on a research flight.

I suppose that the reason I am so impressed with flight planning and equipment knowledge is because I spend so much time in these areas ... usually two weeks of concentrated effort to accomplish one 11-minute flight. I help create the flight plans for each of my flights. Then, working with the engineers, decide how fast and how high to fly, what angles of attack to use, and where to upset the airplane to see how it responds to Mach 4 or 5 or at 120,000 feet. We use computers tied into a flight simulator and study profiles over and over again to determine what we can learn from a flight and what troubles we might expect. From this we can determine alternatives to use in the event of system failures. Each specialist on the aircraft discusses his system with me in detail until I hopefully know it completely. Finally, with a flight plan in hand, I spend hours in the simulator trying to cope with every emergency thrown my way. During this period I jump off in an F-104 to shoot flameout

landing approaches since the X-15 does finish with a dead-stick landing. This may be put in the skill and judgment department, but I like to think that I'm merely putting a fine edge on these qualities so I can come as close as possible to the spot they've marked on the runway for landing.

Each time I've climbed aboard the X-15 I've felt more adequately prepared than for any flight I've ever made, mainly because the flight plan and knowledge of the aircraft are all stored in my memory bin. We don't always have time to read checklists or emergency procedures when an aircraft is in trouble. Knowing what to do immediately has paid off big in the X-15. We've had a number of emergencies, failures, and problems in flight that have been quickly handled by the pilot, allowing him to safely recover the machine.

In closing I'd like to make an observation that should be particularly appropriate to TAC drivers. Although the X-15 is a research rocket aircraft, giving many technical answers to the aircraft designers, those of us who fly it are trying to do the job by applying the same facets of flight safety we all use today. In our work, we hope to prove that the human pilot can still do the job best, even though it's at the higher speeds and higher altitudes. We believe the winged aircraft and its pilot can play as big a part in tomorrow's Air Force as in today's.





## About the Author

Major Robert M. White is from New York City and first entered the Air Force in 1942. He graduated from the pilot training program in February 1944, and flew 52 combat missions with the 355th Fighter Group in the ETO before being shot down by anti-aircraft fire between Munich and Nurnberg. He spent the rest of World War II in German prison camps.

Major White was released from active duty in December 1945 and was recalled in May 1951. In January 1952 he was transferred to Johnson Air Base, Japan, where he remained until July 1953, flying with the 40th Fighter Interceptor Squadron.

He graduated from the USAF Experimental Flight Test Pilot School at Edwards Air Force Base in January 1955. At Edwards, he has been active in such projects as Phase IV testing on the F-86K and F-89H; Phase VI on the F-102 and Phase II on the F-105B and the X-3. He is currently assigned as Assistant Chief of the Flight Test Operations Division, Directorate of Flight Test at the Flight Test Center.

In 1958 Major White was appointed the USAF project pilot for the X-15 research program. His initial flight in the X-15 was made April 15, 1960 and in August he took the research craft to 136,500 feet, the highest attained in the vehicle equipped with the interim XLR-11 engine.

*Nearly 50 years later, the basic foundations of thorough preflight planning, systems knowledge, and flying fundamentals still represent the cornerstones of aviation safety.*

*Col Mayeux*





# F-15 SITUATIONAL EMERGENCY TRAINING

Reprinted from  
TAC Attack,  
March 1978

BY CAPT JIM HALE AND CAPT JIM WILLIFORD

“**##&##&%%, you really DON'T have any Boldface?**”

**T**he outburst came forcefully at first, and then tapered off to a wistful whine. The pilot was reading the F-15 Dash One for the first time (the word heresy surfaced in his mind). Our Wise One (your basic ops officer), radiating inner strength, omniscience, and humility, calmly deflected the barrage with an appropriate, profound quote from John Muir (flashback to ops officer as a young boy growing up among intellectuals in small Junior College near Malibu Beach): “When we try to pick out anything by itself, we find it hitched to everything else in the universe.”





In this article, we'll attempt to give the reader background information on some new directions being taken in the F-15 community with respect to training – specifically, emergency (we call 'em abnormal) procedures. The lack of Boldface is just one aspect of a pervasive new philosophy about how to train people to make the SYSTEM (pilot plus machine) more effective. We don't pretend to have "the answer" for everyone else in the flying business, or the Air Force as a whole, but we do want to encourage review and more study of the training problem in light of the huge advances in the fields of education, engineering, human factors, etc., over the last 20 years. We'll discuss some of that research and apply it in the light of the direction taken in F-15 methods.

The way in which "all the stuff" involving F-15 operations is digested by the pilots is similar to a model used for training SAGE crews in Aerospace Command. The Sage System Training Program (SSTP) was based on the following five

principles developed under laboratory simulation conditions:

1. Train a (large) functionally complete unit.
2. Simulate the environment adequately.
3. Train for FLEXIBILITY. Emphasis was on hypothesis formation testing in a variety of operational contexts. Hence, many different types of problems are run.
4. Promote SYSTEM skills and understanding. Emphasis was on the operator's understanding of how his job (actions) fitted into the overall systems, rather than on his job, per se.
5. Monitor and record performance and provide knowledge of results.

We feel there are two important points related to flying safely which are indirectly related to Boldface procedures. They are sometimes forgotten or are not intuitively obvious to a pilot under stress.

**First, the problem is not an isolated incident which occurs in a vacuum, unrelated to anything else; and secondly, *YOU* are responsible for your actions in the aircraft and your actions and their effects likewise do not take place in a vacuum.**

Unfortunately, the sheer weight of numerous Boldface procedures might tend to seduce the user into complacency because Boldface is "the answer." Once the actions in big, black letters have been accomplished, it is easy for the pilot to

implicitly assume that he can no longer be held responsible for what happens afterward. After all, he didn't have a hand in formulating "the answer." So, if things go sour after the initial attempt to rectify the problem, the pilot may not be mentally or emotionally prepared to cope with subsequent unanticipated complications.

It is conceivable that, in certain circumstances, the rote memory approach to Boldface procedures training might actually preclude all three steps listed in the introduction to Section III of the Flight Manual:

1. Maintain aircraft control.
2. Analyze the situation and take proper action.
3. Land as soon as practical.

This is certainly not the intent of many training programs currently in effect, but the application of the technique may result in cultivating a flock of parrots rather than pilots (or eagles, if you prefer).

At most fighter wings, heavy emphasis is placed on knowing the Boldface steps; but information contained in a warning, caution, or note is asked much less frequently. If you bust Boldface, you don't fly. Not so much with the other "general knowledge" examinations. This holds true for IG inspections.

Busting boldface tests nearly always results in death for all concerned, but missing other questions on aircraft in general is not treated nearly as bad.

However, two TAC accidents have indicated that Boldface procedures were not performed as required, or that while performing the Boldface, aircraft control was not maintained. Recommendations from these accidents included, "...reemphasize through Stan/Eval programs the need to maintain aircraft control before prematurely attempting to analyze and correct the situation." We believe that all this points to a need to reassess emergency procedure training programs.

According to experts at the Air Force Human Resources Laboratory (AFHRL), Boldface procedures and tests have three major limitations: "Judgment is not allowed, diagnosis is provided in the problem statement, and only Boldface procedures are regularly treated." Overall system knowledge and flexibility are not sufficiently emphasized.





Photo by: SSgt Michael B. Keller

In addition, the lack of emphasis on systems knowledge and flexible judgment (a subjective and slippery thing to deal with in our quantitative environment) does not occupy the place it should in the training programs involved with emergency procedures. As stated by the AFHRL: "Boldface training discourages judgment or makes it harder to exercise."

"Whence cometh Boldface, anyway," we hear you cry. Boldface was implemented in the late fifties as a result of a meeting on the format of flight manuals. Back then, the aircraft crump rate gave birth to nifty slogans like, "a plan a day in Tampa Bay." The T-33 was used as a training vehicle in UPT, and some of the IPs were requiring their students to memorize all the checklist items. Actually, there were probably just a few things that would get you killed in a hurry if not immediately taken care of – like an engine flameout at low altitude. With the knowledge and sophistication in training and educational techniques, and the reliability of aircraft of that time, Boldface was deemed the best way to solve the problem of dealing with emergencies. It was implemented in military specification manuals:

Flight, MIL-SPEC MIL M-7700A states that the emergency must:

1. Be a serious emergency.
2. Be acted upon with no time to refer to the printed checklist.
3. Have a reasonable frequency rate.

At first, there were few procedures deemed serious enough to merit Boldface treatment. But, like Jack's magic beanstalk, they just grew and grew. However, according to Dr. Anchard Zeller (aviation psychologist), Directorate of Aerospace Safety, Norton AFB, CA, no known studies have been conducted to determine the effectiveness of the Boldface training approach.

By surfacing some of the deficiencies inherent in Boldface, we hope to provide a stimulus to explore alternative courses of action, improve present training programs, and reevaluate boldface procedures and the methods used to test them.

Why did the F-15 take another approach to the handling of abnormal situations? From the beginning, the ISD training approach was applied to the F-15. In 1974, TAC sent a letter to the F-15 Systems Program Office (SPO) suggesting that Boldface

procedures be implemented until research had been done on the new methods of training. Neither the SPO nor the JTF pilots, working with ISD, MCAIR, and the 555 TFS agreed; so the Dash One was published without Boldface. Section III of the flight manual has an expanded narrative of possible abnormal situations and suggested ways of dealing with them. If this sounds a little wishy-washy, check the safety record of the F-15 to date. It is flown aggressively by your basic Air Force pilots; and although there have been several major mishaps most have been flown to a landing by their pilots; a tribute to their systems knowledge (and a well designed airplane).

Situational emergency training appears to generate a more positive attitude than Boldface training. The CPT is off in a quiet room. Generally there are only two pilots there; a mutually supportive climate exists as "what ifs" are discussed, and even lieutenants find their opinions are respected by others. Moving the switches provides for better transfer of learning than writing Boldface down, but even this is limiting. It's just another way of attempting to get better simulation. Some CPT sessions last more than 2 hours with almost the entire Dash One covered. Normally, one pilot will act as instructor while the other performs required operations. Then they switch roles. All abnormal procedures are presented in a situational context, limited only by the instructor's imagination and ingenuity. This has generated an atmosphere in which most pilots are conversant with items normally covered around page E-22 in one's checklist. In addition, of course, Stan/Eval provides frequent written examinations to keep everyone up to speed (at least that's standard).

Finally, if your head isn't already nodding, or if you're not late for your ground training, we'll quote from SYSTEMS ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES by Dr. Kenyon B. DeGreene which sort of sums up the way we should be looking at our training programs:

"Task analysis is usually iterative ... Task and analysis are basic to the development of other ... subsystem products ... Data derived in task analysis do not generate these products, but they provide for subsequent evaluation and treatment." (Italics are ours).

Advances within the Air Force over the last 20 years have been impressive indeed. We need to be sure that all the components of the "aerospace system" are optimally integrated at the highest level of development possible. New training concepts need to be explored and utilized.

Boldface was one way the Air Force decided to deal with the problems of emergency situations many years ago. The explosion of knowledge in the fields directly affecting pilot training and education, since Boldface was instituted, needs to be critically evaluated and adapted to the improvement of pilot capabilities today and tomorrow. There's no doubt that we are being supplied with the best hardware in the world. It's up to us to learn to employ it effectively and safely. ✪

*An interesting look back at how we got to where we are now. The F-15 community still has no boldfaces. The Viper community went with CAPs - critical action procedures - which are like boldfaces (but different). Bottom line: All rely on solid systems and procedural knowledge and practice to successfully resolve an aircraft emergency. True then ... true today.*

*Col Mayeux*

Photo by: TSgt Ben Bloker





## Reprinted from TAC Attack, February 1981

BY COL JAMES RIDER

**O**n your next combat mission, you can expect to be met by a mixed combination of fighter interceptors, missiles, and anti-aircraft guns. All of these threats will be directed by accurate ground and airborne radar systems, and only the most highly skilled and well-trained crews could possibly penetrate these sophisticated enemy defenses. So, what's new? You think about this every time you prepare for, brief, conduct, and debrief a tactical mission. Knowing and countering the threat, successfully completing the mission, and returning safely make up the name of the game.

In the Tactical Air Command today, we have the most realistic training program, short of actual combat, that I have seen in more than 25 years of flying fighters. Yet not all phases of the mission are always completed: not everyone we send out on a mission returns safely. The crew has not defeated the threat if they and their jet are a smoking hole.

During the war in Southeast Asia, we had a very high aircraft damaged/destroyed rate when operations were conducted below 4,500 feet AGL. The reason quite simply was that every Son-of-a-Bolshevik out there had a weapon, small as it may have been, and he fired it at every passing US aircraft. In that case (and I realize it probably won't apply in the next conflict), a simple solution was to stay above the area where ground fire became the highest threat.

Obviously, as we rip over the enemy terrain at 500 KTS in today's projected threat environment, the priority threat at any instant may very well be different than it was 10 miles and slightly over one minute ago. We have to react fast to what's around us; at the same time, we must think more than 10 miles ahead of our jet, exercise good visual lookout, check RHAW, monitor aircraft systems, and do the whole gamut of tasks associated with successfully accomplishing the assigned mission.





Photo by: MSgt Michael Ammons

Consider the way we train to be able to really do this job. There are those who feel the only way is to fly as close to the ground as they can get, hoping not to be detected. Others plan and fly profiles that use different heights above the ground, direct and /or indirect terrain masking, based on the highest in that segment of the mission. In reality, as surely as there are going to be times in combat that you must fly at 100 feet or less to survive, there are times that you should be at 1,000 or



Photo by: SSgt Joshua Strang

even 10,000 feet. Let's look at a hypothetical mission where you ingress through an area protected by fighters, transition into a rolling terrain area populated by mobile SAMs, and finally, hit a target protected by short range SAMs and AAA: a tough but typical scenario.

Take the mission apart and look at the pieces. The first threat is GCI controlled fighters. You would like to make it difficult for them to find and intercept you and at the same time limit the area of visual lookout required for you or your wingie to detect them. If your choice is to fly near the ground, you have to cover only a hemisphere of airspace. Stay high enough that your shadows won't make it easy for the enemy to find you and low enough that he can't slip up from below. To have good visual lookout behind your 3-9 o'clock line as well as staying away from your shadows, an altitude around 1,000 feet AGL seems to best fit the circumstances. If attacked by a fighter, detection probability is high, you have maneuvering room to counter the attack, and the age-old option of unload and push it up is still there. Here is the rub: in combat or in training, once you have decided to counter an airborne threat by going like blazes very close to the ground, you have just changed the threat pattern. The closer to the ground you are, the less time you can afford looking for the other threats. Your eggs are all in one basket, and that peek behind to see if he is catching up could easily be your last.

When you finally commit to as low as you can go, the most serious threat is the rocks! In training, it's the only real threat. It's not simulated; you hit it and you're dead as surely as if you were gunned by a MIG or a SAM. The difference is that the enemy never fired a shot.

But, on with the scenario: as you continue your mission into the SAM defended areas, the air threat decreases. I'm fairly confident their aerial hunters are not too interested in becoming a target for one of their own underpaid conscripts (although some capability for simultaneous engagement probably exists). Now your primary threat is a combination of radar detection, medium to long range SAMs, and the ground; in this area you may need to fly lower. Depending on how much terrain masking is available, you will probably need to be in the 300 to 500 foot range. That gives you less lookout behind the 3-9 o'clock line, but plenty of time to look and plan ahead and monitor RHAW, and still some room to maneuver. If needed, you can still take it down; but again, once you have made your move down, the rocks become the big threat.

The final run into and out of the target areas is tough, and there is where you earn your pay. Defenses may be intense, but, if your only option is to run in at high speed in the weeds, the greatest real threat may be Old Mother Earth. The other things distract you from watching this real threat. You make your pop, put the bombs on target, and hang your backside out to all these other threats and then get back down in the weeds. While



Photo by: TSgt Jeffrey Allen

you're descending into the ground threat environment, the enemy is doing his best to get your attention at a time when even a minor distraction can give him a cheap kill.

The enemy threats are many, mobile, and good; but they are not perfect. The ultimate threat of high speed contact with the ground is almost perfect, but it's controlled by you, the highly trained, steely eyed fighter pilot. The ground won't "jump up and hit you in the face" if you keep your perspective and priorities straight when you fly close to the earth in an environment that's always high threat. 🦋

*Today's munitions and stealth have opened up options for ingress and weapons delivery that mitigate much of the risk, starting with the rocks at low altitude. But every tactical scenario's planning starts with a solid look at every threat and the best ways to avoid it. True in 1981, and true today.*

*Col Mayeux*



# WHOA!

**Reprinted from Combat Edge, May 1997**

BY LT COL EZEQUIEL PARRILLA, JR.

**T**here we were, slipping the surlies in our “Bone.” The flight progressed normally until we started an en route descent 30 miles north of Base D. At that point, the Central Integrated Test System (CITS) flagged a MUX 13 message. For those not familiar with the B-1B’s many acronyms, the CITS is a system that monitors aircraft systems. When a system is out of certain parameters, a message is displayed in the CITS monitor at the aft station. By using certain codes, we can also check all kinds of neat stuff such as brake temperatures, bleed air temperatures, valve positions, your astrological sign, etc. The Electric Multiplex (EMUX) system manages the aircraft’s electric load through the use of several black boxes (MUX boxes), with each box having a backup (redundancy box). In some systems, when we move a switch in the jet, all we are doing is requesting permission from EMUX to use that system. If the right conditions are met (airspeed, electric load, etc.), then EMUX in its great wisdom allows us to use that system (yes, this material is testable).





The CITS flagged a MUX 13 redundancy message signaling the total loss of the MUX 13 box and possibly some of the associated systems. We checked to see which systems might be affected. Among these were the hydraulic system and the landing gear. I immediately lowered the landing gear, obtaining good indications. The hydraulic systems showed normal pressure. We lost the Inertial Navigation System (INS), so we used the backup Gyro Stabilization System for navigation. At odd intervals, a handful of caution lights would flash in the pilot's master caution panel. They would flash so fast that we could not determine which lights they were. We decided that even though there were no steady caution lights and all systems looked good other than the INS, we would make one approach to a full stop. Our Defensive Systems Officer (DSO) advised our command post of this and tried to get more specific information on possible effects of our problem. While the copilot flew the aircraft, I (Aircraft Commander) performed the necessary checklist items with the help of the Offensive Systems Officer (OSO) and the Instructor OSO (oh yeah, I forgot to tell you; this was back before we figured out flying 6 crewmembers with 4 ejection seats at .95 Mach was not such a hot idea). The DSO attempted the B-1 fix-all (reset) on



Photo by: SrA Brian Ferguson

the MUX system to no avail. The interval between the caution lights flashing seemed to decrease, so I elected to configure the aircraft early and fly the approach at flap limiting airspeed until 2 miles from touchdown. The copilot watered my eyes with an excellent landing; and at touchdown, CITS flagged the anti-skid system. I visually checked the anti-skid switch position and verified the anti-skid caution light was out. I had experienced this message at touchdown on several occasions with no actual malfunction, so I advised the copilot to continue with our briefed procedure of checking the

brakes at the 7000 feet remaining marker. He also added a slight forward stick pressure for aerobraking until 40 knots below approach speed, when he applied full aft stick. At 7000 feet remaining, he checked the brakes successfully; and at the 5000 marker he applied the brakes again, slowing down below 50 knots. With 1500 feet remaining, the copilot attempted to slow down the aircraft to taxi speed to clear the runway. This time the brakes were inoperative and he announced

**“We have no brakes!” I took command of the jet and applied the brakes with no response. I then told the copilot “Go to emergency.”**

He placed the emergency brake switch to Emergency, calmly announced the loss of brakes to the tower and requested fire coverage. With the emergency brake system, we had no anti-skid; so I tried to be gentle applying the brakes. However, as soon as I applied pressure with my size 11s, I heard a loud bang and the aircraft started moving sideways toward the right edge of the runway with the tail skidding considerably. I released the brakes and attempted to engage the nosewheel steering, with no result. With both the departure and the right edge of the runway rapidly approaching, I slammed on the left brake and started to reach for the engine start and shutdown switches. The aircraft started to skid to the left and came to an abrupt stop about 100 feet from the departure end and 30 feet from the right edge of the runway. I was then concerned with the possibility of engine damage/fire from what I

assumed would be at least one blown tire. While I questioned tower on any smoke/unusual indications, the Instructor OSO lowered the ladder and visually scanned the area. The OSO and DSO verified on CITS that the temperatures were normal. Tower personnel reported some white smoke had been seen before, but there was none now. This was verified by our fearless Instructor OSO, who also found no visible damage. We shut down the engines on the runway and the aircraft was towed to parking. All main gear tires were changed; however, there was no aircraft damage. Three were worn beyond limits and the side stress on the others had rendered them unusable. Besides scaring a few years off of my life, the incident really brought to my mind a few things that I had instructors drill to me and I passed on to my students. Fly the Airplane

I have to admit I relaxed some after we touched down and checked the brakes. However, when I heard the pilot's comment about the brakes, my adrenaline went back to where it was and then some. Even though you have landed the aircraft, there are a lot of things to be done before you can start patting yourself and your crew on the back. The brakes in this airplane work so well that 9 times out of 10 you have to add power to taxi to the end of the runway. Someone a lot smarter than

me once said, “There is nothing more useless than the altitude above you and the runway behind you.” You may think twice before trying to rush to get to the end of the runway to let the airplane behind you get a touch and go. I'd hate to think what could have happened if we had been going much faster or if the runway was wet, especially with the rubber deposits we then had at Base D. With the loss of MUX 13, the anti-skid system malfunctioned so that it released the pressure on the brakes. By selecting the emergency brake system, we deenergized the anti-skid system. The accumulators used for emergency braking can give us 7 to 14 applications. However, in this case, the engines were running and the hydraulic systems were operating normally keeping the accumulators charged; so we had unlimited applications available.

### Know your Boldface

They are boldface items for a reason. With the end of the runway rapidly approaching, there was no time to think about the brake failure procedure. I cannot print the word that came to my mind after I stepped on the brakes with no effect, but the first words out of my mouth were the boldface I had written so many times for our beloved Stan/Eval types. Judging by the quickness of his reaction, I'm sure it was on the copilot's mind also.



### When in Doubt, Get Help

Since the only system we had actually lost was the INS, I elected not to declare an emergency. The fire department responded in a short time, but it felt like an eternity for somebody sitting in a crippled jet. There are many things we have yet to learn concerning partial EMUX failures. It doesn't pay to underestimate EMUX. If some of your black boxes go TILT on you, maybe you ought to get as much help as you can.

The old adage that goes “Aviation in itself is not inherently dangerous; but to an even greater degree than the sea, it is terribly unforgiving of any carelessness, incapacity or neglect” still applies in our electric jets just as in any other aircraft. This is true not only for actual flying but also mission planning. When you are about to run out of runway is not the time to decide who is going to do what and when. Take your time in mission planning to decide how you will handle an emergency. You owe it to yourself. **FLY SAFE!** ✈️



Photo by: SrA Corey Hook



*Systems and procedural knowledge saved the day, along with a big boost from Crew Resource Management. In today's modern aircraft, we're often "told" by the system what the problem is, but that message can be incomplete. This loss of brakes came as a surprise, but solid boldface knowledge and execution helped this pilot and crew bring a national treasure to a safe stop.*

Col Mayeux



Aircrew Safety



**1LT JONATHAN V. RYDBERG AND SSGT WILLIAM C. KELTNER, 46 ERS, 332 AEW, BALAD, IRAQ.** Lt Rydberg and SSgt Keltner successfully recovered a crippled MQ-1B Predator RPA. They received an emergency aircraft from an MCE crew experiencing low oil pressure warnings and a possible engine oil leak. Unable to accept an ILS approach due to the MQ-1B's lack of ILS capability and unable to overfly the weather due to the nature of the emergency, the pilot requested a GLS approach to runway 3R. The pilot maintained GLS parameters and continued the approach until the runway again became visible and a visual transition to landing could be made. (Feb 11)

**BATT 12, 43 ECS, 355 FW, DAVIS-MONTHAN AFB AZ.** Three hours into a night training mission, the crew of EC-130H recognized an unsafe Left Main Landing Gear (LMLG) indication on final approach. The crew confirmed the LMLG was stuck in the up position and hydraulic fluid was leaking onto it. With no published procedures for this malfunction, the crew utilized CRM on board and determined the gear would have to be manually raised. With gear secured, it was determined that normal brakes were inoperable due to the hydraulic leak, and landed light weight using the emergency brakes. The crew stopped the aircraft on the runway with the use of reverse power from the propellers. (Mar 11)

Crew Chief Safety



**SSGT ANDREW T. BYRD, 451 EAMXS, 451 AEW, KANDAHAR AF, AFGHANISTAN.** During inspection of an A-10, SSgt Byrd identified a cut in the sidewall of the nose landing gear tire. The cut was deep enough to render the tire unsafe for flight. As he back tracked the steps of the aircraft, he noticed a large metal bracket mounted on the ground in front of the fuel barn used to secure the clamshell door during inclement weather. To prevent further incidents, he coordinated with the Fabrication Flight to cut off the bolt threads flush with the nuts. Due to his proactive actions, a hazard on the new ramp has been identified and eliminated and zulu ramp is now a safer place to operate our aircraft. (Feb 11)

**SSGT WILLIAM A. HATTEN, 28 AMXS, 28 BW, ELLSWORTH AFB SD.** During a B-1 recovery, SSgt Hatten discovered a brake over temp upon landing. He correctly identified a faulty brake temperature sensor during the brake change by collecting data from the aircrew regarding temperature fluctuations during landing and taxi. Both the brake and temperature sensor were ordered, received and replaced in less than 1 hour vs. the 2.5 hour standard, ensuring the aircraft was returned to full mission-capable status in record time. (Mar 11)

Ground Safety



**TSgt DEXTER J. WHITE, 432 AMXS, 432 WG, CREECH AFB NV.** TSgt White created a standalone lighting system for the windowless Reaper Aircraft Maintenance Unit Support section. Using spare uninterruptable power supplies, light fixtures, and a light-all generator, he provided light to a hazardous industrial area, greatly reducing the potential for a major mishap. He discovered an arcing Gorgon Stare power supply adapter posing a risk of serious electrocution. He also identified a government motor vehicle with a malfunctioning airbag system. TSgt White's continued attention to detail and constant safety awareness is to be commended. (Feb 11)

**SSGT THOMAS J. TATRO, 7 CMS, 7 BW, DYESS AFB TX.** SSgt Tatro safeguarded the life of an Airman who had suffered a head injury while moving a workbench. He assessed the situation, removed the Airman from the danger, and applied self-aid and buddy care. His use of first aid skills reduced the potential of long-term injury or death of the Airman. He also called a knock-it-off for all equipment relocation until the status of each unit could be verified. SSgt Tatro inspected and secured the light assemblies on three additional workbenches, and briefed the shop about the ORM process and how it pertains to moving heavy furniture. (Mar 11)

Flight Line Safety



**SSGT GREGORY BREITLING, 966 AACs, 552 ACW, TINKER AFB OK.** While waiting for the successful completion of de-icing on his aircraft, SSgt Breitling noticed that another aircraft, taxiing for takeoff, did not appear to be completely clear of ice. He called the SOF and radioed the taxiing aircraft informing them to stop taxi. He conveyed the concern that any ice formation on the rotodome could break off during the takeoff roll or while in flight, severely damaging the aircraft's vertical stabilizer, rudder, or flight controls making the aircraft uncontrollable. SSgt Breitling's swift actions broke the potentially dangerous chain of events and prevented damage to a \$330M E-3 aircraft. (Mar 11)

Pilot Safety



**CAPT AARON M. PALAN, 75 EFS, KANDAHAR AF, AFGHANISTAN.** During initial climb-out as a wingman in a 2-ship of A-10C's, passing 2,000' AGL, Capt Palan experienced an illuminated Master Caution light with associate L-ENG OIL PRESS indication. He executed the checklist and shut down the affected engine IAW tech orders. While preparing to jettison his stores, he experienced a HATR event. Capt Palan maintained a holding pattern while single-engine on NVGs, in low illumination for over 30 minutes accomplishing the complex coordination and safely recovered the aircraft with a single-engine straight-in landing at Kandahar. (Feb 11)

**CAPT OLIVER E. AARON, 27 FS, 1 FW, JOINT BASE LANGLEY-EUSTIS, VA.** While accomplishing his night MQT syllabus flight in the F-22, as #2 in sensor trail, Capt Aaron got a RADAR FAIL Integrated Caution Advisory and Warning. Finding himself in a cloud bank, he lost sight of #1; he executed lost Wingman procedures and kept the altitude deconfliction he had built into the rejoin. While setting up avionics, the left and right secondary multi-function displays and the HUD/ICP all went blank. Capt Aaron and his chase aircraft proceeded to RTB to a visual approach and landed uneventfully. (Mar 11)

Weapons Safety



**SSGT STEVEN CAMARAO, 332 EAMXS, 332 AEW, JOINT BASE BALAD, IRAQ.** An F-16 had experienced a cockpit malfunction and inadvertent munitions release while jettisoning the external wing tanks during an in-flight emergency. After helping replace the MMC, SSgt Camarao realized there was no written tech data to reference while trying to reproduce the fault or checking to see if the replacement fixed the problem. He devised a plan to use elements of several different weapons load testers and additional technicians to monitor all available stations. His shrewd and creative troubleshooting ensured the aircraft was fully functional and safe for return to flying Air Tasking Order missions. (Feb 11)

**TSgt DANIEL DELOSSANTOS, 407 EOSS, ALI AB, IRAQ.** As the subject matter expert for all arms-related issues, TSgt DeloSantos provided basic armory training for the Iraqi AF personnel, ensuring they are prepared for army duties and responsibilities. He also developed a comprehensive Shoot, Move, Communicate course of fire for ESFF personnel. His initiative and expertise provided for safe weapons handling practices, thwarted multiple weapons malfunctions, provided for a seamless integration of host nation forces, and improved the overall effectiveness of personnel. (Mar 11)

Unit Safety



**407TH EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL (EOD) UNIT, ALI BASE, IRAQ.** Upon notification of a suspicious un-attended vehicle just outside of Entry Control Point 1, EOD personnel quickly swept and cleared the vehicle, minimizing the impact to coalition operations and ensuring the safety of security personnel. Skilled robot driving expedited threat resolution, ensuring minimal impact to aircraft operations. Through training opportunities and real-world events, EOD effectively prevented coalition/Iraqi casualties from explosive-related hazards. (Mar 11)



Flight Safety



**CAPT BENJAMIN N. JODY, 386 AEW, ALI AL SALEM AB, KUWAIT.** Capt Jody’s supercharged mishap prevention efforts enabled the 386 AEW to conduct over 3,300 combat sorties in support of OND and OEF as well as Pakistani flood relief without a major incident. When a brake fire handcuffed a C-130 at Mosul, Iraq, he sprang into action leading an eight-person mx and safety team to the site within hours of the incident. The crew’s instant response and spectacular repair efforts had the plane flying combat missions the next day. Capt Jody continued his quest to make AOR flying safer by attacking AFCENT’s #1 flight safety issue, HATRs. His phenomenal knowledge of flying procedures and inquisitive investigations of seven reports yielded findings which slashed flight risks in some of the most congested airspace in the world. He furthered his risk mitigation efforts by energizing ties with the Wing’s EOG which led to monthly safety briefs to over 100 flyers which included lessons learned from three Class A mishaps. He also hatched and executed an innovative plan to brief the Wing’s 24 crews on recent HATR activity as they stepped to fly. His proactive approach to flight safety put critical information where it is needed most -- with crews. The results speak for themselves -- zero major incidents. Along with mishap prevention, Capt Jody took Host Nation relations to a new level when he lectured at the second ever KAF Safety Officer Course. As part of the Army-led class, he briefed KAF officers on aircraft accident investigation helping to shape their fledgling safety program and earning a huge win for partnership capacity. Capt Jody’s superb flight safety performance didn’t stop there. Always looking to eliminate hazards, he alertly identified deteriorating runway conditions, at Ali Al Salem, to leadership as a threat to flight ops.

Ground Safety



**SMSGT DAVID J. MARTIN, 552 ACW, TINKER AFB OK.** During the FY11 first quarter, SMSgt Martin exemplified the war fighter ethos and displayed his dedication to safety while deployed to USAFCENT. As AFCENT’s Ground Safety functional, SMSgt Martin directed the efforts of 84+ safety professionals and managed 20 wing ground safety programs in the NAF and AOR. He provided guidance and technical advice to leaders and helped mitigate risks for 63K+ war fighters and \$900B worth of AF assets. Acting as the AEF coordinator, he facilitated MAJCOM and AEF Center efforts to ensure safety program manning challenges were resolved and ground safety positions across the AOR were 100% postured. Moreover, SMSgt Martin revised the SAV and PME checklists to exact USAFCENT/SE compliance. He also revamped 20 questions for the 2011 AFCAST survey enhancing a critical safety resource for AF leaders. Using his expertise, he was able to ensure a flawless re-write and close out of a high-interest Class B mishap report within 5 days of his arrival. In addition, he provided critical logistics support to a Class A Safety Investigation Board in the AOR. His efforts ensured a timely investigation and were key to future mishap prevention. This strategic thinker collaborated with USAFCENT/JA, AFSC/JA, AMC, ACC, CENTCOM, DynCorp, and others to resolve AOR vehicle mishap reporting, material handling, electrical safety and motorcycle safety concerns. As one of many speakers attending the USAFCENT AOR Chief of Safety Conference, Dave orated an awe-inspiring briefing and was personally invited to the ACC Safety Summit by ACC’s Deputy Director of Safety. Finally, SMSgt Martin was selected as NAF/MAJCOM safety awards board member, where he reviewed over 100 records and ensured over 25 Airmen were recognized for their contributions to safety. SMSgt Martin’s hard work and dedication embodies the safety ethos.

Weapons Safety



**MSGT KEVIN D. METZGER, 380 AEW, AL DHAFRA, UAE.** MSgt Metzger promoted HN relations by enhancing the safety of 2,000+ base personnel and thousands of Host Nation civilians/military. At HN request, he created an ESP package for a HN MSA addressing civilian encroachment issues for over 40 munitions bunkers. MSgt Metzger combined satellite imagery, geo-base mapping and plotting tools, and ESP software to build and present a comprehensive D-8 map of the HN MSA. This resulted in the HN’s first all inclusive map, illustrating facilities and ECZ’s for each munitions bunker. This planning tool facilitates precise HN construction site placement, ensuring the safety of the royal family’s nearby palace. He also promoted HN relations, delivering flawless weapons safety support to the HN AWC’s Exercise IRON FALCON, flying 681 sorties and 4.3K expenditures — all with zero safety violations. MSgt Metzger coordinated and directed a full-scale MSA fire drill, validating evacuation, cordon, notification, and firefighting procedures of all agencies, illustrating the complications of operating within a MSA. He completed a base-wide review and update of all US explosive locations, resulting in a new base D-8 map. The new capabilities include a 700% increase in 1.1 NEW capability — the result of his efforts to solve a persistent lightening protection system discrepancy. MSgt Metzger conducted a full review of the local EOD OI and inspected EOD procedures on a nearby HN proficiency range, validating all procedures. He mitigated a RAC 2 hazard at the US APB, separating fuel trucks from nearby MSAs. He led an action group constructing a new parking area, protecting 300+ personnel and \$111M in assets. Finally, MSgt Metzger facilitated the AFCENT/CC’s #1 priority, establishing a 380 AEW MSA, developing multiple options, conducting three site surveys, and briefing wing staff on associated risk analysis.

Mishap Statistics Scoreboard

FY11 Flight

As of March 31, 2011

	Fatal	Aircraft Destroyed	Aircraft Damaged
1 AF			
9 AF			
12 AF			
USAFWC			
ANG (ACC-gained)			
AFRC (ACC-gained)			

FY11 Ground

As of March 31, 2011

	Fatal	Class A	Class B
9 AF		2	0
12 AF		3	1
DRU's		0	1

FY11 Weapons

As of March 31, 2011

	Class A	Class B
9 AF	0	0
12 AF	0	0
AWFC	0	0

Flight Notes

Due to the combined efforts of everyone in ACC, we experienced no new flight mishaps. Remember, spring is upon us. Historically, that has meant a spike in aviation mishaps as our Airmen knock the rust off and ramp up flight operations that may have dwindled during the bad weather of the past winter. Keep safety in mind for everything you do, mitigate risk when necessary, and look forward to a safer tomorrow.

Ground Notes

As of the end of March 2011, ACC experienced five Class A mishaps. The last Class A mishap in March was not a fatal mishap, but involved a Permanent Total Disability. The mishap occurred when a PMV2 left the road and crashed into a ditch. As a result of the mishap, the operator of the PMV2 sustained multiple injuries; alcohol was a contributing factor in the mishap. There are rules and standards by which we all must abide. Following said rules could be the difference between saving your life or not making it home safely.

Weapons Notes

Great job ACC weapons community for educating yourselves and others on mishap prevention. Safety awareness never stops and we need to be ever vigilant. Over the last quarter, we experienced one Class C and four Class E mishaps. All five mishaps were the result of complacency and not following technical order procedures. This trend continues to be the leading contributor to most weapons safety mishaps in ACC. Additionally, the mishaps we experienced fell within two munitions types -- small arms and impulse carts. Let’s focus on these two areas and eliminate human error from the equation. Then and only then will we reverse this negative trend. Thanks for all you do for the ACC weapons safety community.

Legend

Class A - Permanent Total Disability; Property Damage \$2,000,000 or more  
Class B - Permanent Partial Disability; Property Damage between \$500,000 and \$2,000,000  
Class C - Lost Workday; Property Damage between \$50,000 and \$500,000  
(Class Description Effective October 1, 2009)

\*\* Non-rate Producing      \* Fatality

= Fatal      = Fatal due to misconduct

Symbols for Mishap Aircraft





# Over the Edge



ARE **YOU** READY  
FOR THE CRITICAL  
DAYS OF SUMMER?

don't be one of the  
“**NUMBERS**”

PAGE 6

+

Seven  
Stupid  
Airmen

PAGE 8





**If you're  
tanned,  
you're  
toast.**

**Tanned or sunburned  
— it's damaged skin.**



Choose Your Cover

## Over the Edge

CONTENTS

### 3 | You Might Be THAT GUY


#### 4 | SUMMER IS HOT

by MSgt Kevin Scott,  
HQ ACC Ground Safety, Langley AFB, Va.

#### 8 | SEVEN STUPID AIRMEN

by Ami L. Alkonis,  
Nellis AFB, Nev.

**YOU MIGHT BE THAT GUY IF...  
THE LAST THING  
YOU REMEMBER IS  
LYING DOWN**



MESSAGE FOR U.S. MILITARY FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. © FLEISHMAN HILLARD



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# SUMMER IS HOT

## ARE **YOU** READY?

BY MSGT KEVIN SCOTT

If you've been around the Air Force for any length of time, you've heard of the "Critical Days of Summer (CDoS). It's that long awaited time of year when the weather gets warm and the days are long, which allows us to partake in a wider range of outdoor activities. Cookouts, swimming, fishing, softball, hiking, boating, camping, and road trips as well as a plethora of other activities are very popular. Historically, these activities lead to an increase in serious injuries and mishaps during this period.

As much as most people would like to think that nothing could happen to them, the fact is, the real statistics are pretty astounding. In ACC we have statistics dating back for many years and I bet that each one of those individuals involved in a mishap at that time did not think anything would happen to them either. And how did they become one of the "numbers" you may ask?

There were several causes, which contributed to their mishaps. However, if we do not want to repeat those mistakes, every one of us must accept responsibility for our actions and be good Wingmen for our fellow Airmen. These responsibilities include refraining from taking unnecessary risks, especially when alcohol is involved, wearing appropriate safety gear, being aware of your surroundings, skipping an activity if you're inexperienced, and avoiding activities when you're fatigued.

There's always a sense of security when you are taking part in an activity, and you fully believe that nothing will go wrong. It's when you let your guard down, by believing this false sense of security that mishaps occur. But there is one thing you can do to keep you and everyone around you safe this summer: it's called Risk Management. When you're about to take part in any activity, think about the worst-case scenario and then do everything you can to eliminate or at least minimize the risk. If you do, chances are you won't become one of the "numbers."





# don't be one of the “NUMBERS”

**11** DROWNING  
FATALITIES

**2,534**  
TOTAL MISHAPS

**302** NO SEATBELT  
MISHAPS

**14** BOATING  
MISHAPS

**16** SPORTS & REC  
FATALITIES

**391** PMV-4  
MISHAPS

**850** SPORTS & REC  
MISHAPS

**56** PMV-4  
FATALITIES

**18,370**  
DAYS ON QUARTERS

**3,602**  
DAYS IN HOSPITAL

**24** MOTORCYCLE  
FATALITIES

**253** MOTORCYCLE  
MISHAPS



# Seven Stupid Airmen

BY AMI L. ALKONIS

***The following story is true. Names of the people involved have been changed to protect the stupid.***

One sunny spring morning, seven stupid Airmen decided to go fishing and camping at Frontier Lake, just outside of Fort Bragg, North Carolina. As they had many times before, they made their way past the base and onto the narrow dirt road leading to the family camping grounds just northeast of the main base. The road leading to the campsite followed a lake and was relatively smoothed out from both engineering expertise and frequent traffic from the local population. While meeting up at the backside of the lake, one of the vehicles, a Toyota truck, got lost and ended up

at the back access to Fort Bragg's tank trails. As the truck bumped and bounced over the rugged roads, the passengers inside got a wild idea: "Let's go mudding!" So off they went to meet the rest of their party. After taking some potshots about his Toyota Corolla hatchback, Rich decides to drive it along the trails, too ... and surprisingly, it handled the random bumps and jumps right alongside the truck.

Several days later, after regaling their friends with the awesomeness of their trip, the seven stupid Airmen decide to do it again. After they arrive at the lake bed, they begin to unpack their camp gear. While Chase

is kneeling on the bumper pulling out gear, Rich revs forward gaining speed of nearly 15 MPH and continues halfway down the path – with Chase holding onto the rear handle. "Whoa dude! Wait! Do it again!" This time Chase stands on the bumper holding the luggage rack above as they roll down the trail and around the lake. "Sean, you HAVE to try this!" So Sean hops onto the back bumper with Chase – both holding one end of the luggage rack as Rich speeds across the lakebed. When they roll back around to camp, Penny and Emily shake their heads, "Not very safe guys."

Chase turns to Sean, "They're right ... we need ropes." So they proceed to tie ropes to the inside handles, threading the ropes through the corner before closing the hatchback door, creating a loose loop to brace themselves. "Dude, it's like a chariot!" With a renewed sense of safety, the three amigos plow through the lake trails at speeds of 20, then 30 MPH. When they get back, Brett and Chris want a turn. "No way man; you just chill. This is our invention." Not to be outdone or left out, Brett and Chris decide to ride on top, holding onto the luggage rack. So down the tank trails they ride ... one driver, two on the back, and two on the roof.

As they break for lunch, the boys can't get enough of the adrenaline rush and convince their girlfriends that, not only is this the most awesome ride ever, it's also safe because they're "strapped in" with ropes. Penny is onboard, but Emily is more skeptical; what if she loses her grip on the luggage rack? Hmmm ... valid point! But never fear, when recklessness is at hand, crazy, ill-conceived solutions are, too. I present to you (drum roll please) – the bungee cord!

And so down the tank trails they travel: One driver, two on the bumper – holding the ropes, and two on the roof (bungee corded). Everyone wants to ride, but there are only four "positions" outside the car. What's an adventure seeking Airman to do? They tried sitting in the window Dukes of Hazard style, but the trails could

be unpredictably narrow, and they soon tired of being smacked with branches and pine needles – painfully sticky. While taking a break, one of the perilous seven is sitting on the hood of the car when Rich lunges the car forward yelling, "Get in – it's time to go!"

The dim light flickers above Shane's head ... then goes out. "I'll take the hood!" And so Shane takes his spot on the hood, his arm bent backward to hold onto the passenger side of the car. Penny has had enough drama and decides to ride in the front passenger seat. Emily can't get enough. She and Chris are bungee corded to the roof while Chase and Brett ride "chariot" in the back. Rich is emboldened by the power his "POS" now holds. "Bet you wish your truck could do this, eh Chris!?"

Rich decides to take the "long way" back to camp and, being unfamiliar with the roads, he gets lost. But nobody complains as it adds to the adventure. After awhile, they begin to hear ... **ting ... ting ... ting** ... **"What's that?" "Nothing just rocks hitting the car." On they ride '... Ting ... ting ... muffled pop' ... "What's that?" "Stop being paranoid, it's just rocks hitting the car!" '... Ting ... ting ... SCREECH!!!' Slam on the breaks!!!**

Shane flies forward into a deep trench in the road as his life and car pass before his eyes. Chris flies over Emily and lands in front of the car, ripping part of the luggage rack as he goes. Emily summersaults into Chris' ribcage. Chase and Brett slam into the back of the car then recoil back against the rope. Rich and Penny, inside the car wearing their seat belts, are uninjured.

"You nearly killed us!" As Chase and Brett begin to pull Rich from the car and beat him senseless, Penny starts yelling and points at the tree. In bold letters on a bright red sign are the words, "WARNING – live firing range ahead."

As Emily rubs her head (mild concussion), she looks to Chris, "Just rocks?"

Seven stupid Airmen slowly riding home – all of them inside the car ... with seat belts – all except for Chase and Brett who decided it was safer to walk back.

*Each of these Airmen should consider themselves very, very fortunate. It's only a miracle that this senseless act of self-defeating behavior didn't turn tragic! More disturbing is the fact that neither member practiced good wingmanship by calling knock-it-off. Let this be a lesson to all ... Have the courage to say no, and don't be easily influenced into acts of destructive behavior.*

~ Chief Yance Childs, ACC/SEG

